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CHAPTER 15 
Workmen's Compensation 
MACEY J. GOLDMAN 
§15.I. Injuries covered by Workmen's Compensation Act. A basic 
tenet of the Massachusetts Workmen's Compensation Act is that for 
an injury to be compensable, it must arise "out of and in the course 
of ... employment."l This concept has been subject to more litiga-
tion than has any other area of workmen's compensation law. In 
Rupp's Case,2 the Supreme Judicial Court extended the scope of this 
principle to include injuries sustained by an employee when her 
employer suggested that she go home during regular working hours 
because of a severe snowstorm. 
The employee worked for a nursing association. In the course of 
her daily visits she often used a car owned by her employer. On the 
day of the accident, there was a large snow storm. Her employer sug-
gested to her that she leave the car at a garage and walk home. The 
employee was told that she would be on call until her usual quitting 
time. She sustained her injuries when she slipped while walking from 
the garage to her home. A single member of the Industrial Accident 
Board found that this trip was not part of the business of the employer 
and that, therefore, the injury received while returning from work 
was not compensable.3 The Superior Court reversed. On appeal by 
the insurer, the Supreme Judicial Court sustained the Superior Court 
finding. The Court held that inasmuch as the claimant was on call 
until the end of her usual working hours, it was clear that her day's 
work-activity had not been completed. She was on her way home at 
the specific direction of the employer, and she was to remain there 
until her usual working hours had passed. Her activity at the time of 
the injury, therefore, was in the course of her employment and was 
compensable. 
§15.2. Street risk: Serious and willful misconduct of employee. 
General Laws, Chapter 152, Section 26, grants to the employee the 
right to compensation for personal injuries "arising out of an ordinary 
risk of the street while actually engaged, with his employer'S au-
MACEY J. GOLDMAN is a member of the Massachusetts Bar, practicing in Worces-
ter. He was formerly Assistant Editor-in-Chief of the Law Journal of the American 
Trial Lawyers Association, formerly NACCA Law Journal. 
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21967 Mass. Adv. Sh. 993, 227 N.E.2d 329. 
3 See Rourke's Case, 237 Mass. 360, 363-364, l29 N.E. 603, 604, 13 A.L.R. 546, 548-
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thorization, in the business affairs or undertakings of his em-
ployer .... " The Supreme Judicial Court held this section of the 
statute applicable in Caron's Case.1 
The employee, who was killed in the accident resulting in this 
claim, was instructed by his immediate superior to attend an evening 
dinner meeting several miles from his home. The employee arrived at 
his destination at 6:30 P.M. The dinner meeting ended at 9:00 P.M., 
but the employee remained after the others had left to continue a 
conversation about business matters with his superior, a conversation 
that had commenced during the dinner. Throughout the evening he 
had several drinks. At 12:05 A.M., while en route home, the accident 
occurred. Both the single member and the Review Board found that 
the accident occurred while the employee was in the course of his 
employment. The insurer challenged this finding. 
In affirming the Board's finding, the Supreme Judicial Court held 
that Section 26 supports alternative theories upon which compensa-
tion can be based. Either the employee must be injured in a situation 
arising out of and in the course of his employment or, alternatively, 
in an accident arising out of an ordinary risk of the street while 
actually engaged, with his employer's authorization, in the business 
affairs or undertakings of his employer. The Court read the Board's 
finding to be based on this latter alternative. The Court reasoned 
that the nature of the employee's business trip - Caron was required 
to remain as long as he did - indicated that his trip home could rea-
sonably be found to have been an essential part of his mission. The 
Court found it unnecessary to pass on the merits of the insurer's con-
tention that Caron's drinking might have been a defense as willful 
misconduct on the part of the employee under Section 27 of the 
Workmen's Compensation Act.2 
§15.3. Employees in residence on the employer's premises. With 
the exception of hospital employees, it is not usual today for employees 
to reside on the premises of their employers. Nevertheless, cases relat-
ing to such residency have often led to litigation because the employee 
who resides at his employer's home or business establishment is often 
on these premises during non-working hours. 1£ he is injured during 
this time, difficult factual questions arise as to whether the accident 
would be compensable. 
In Kilcoyne's Case,1 the employee was an attendant nurse at a state 
school. The school maintained a limited number of rooms which 
could be used by selected employees as living quarters. The employees' 
manual specifically stated that such quarters were assigned to the em-
ployees "for the convenience of the institution .... " The employer 
charged a nominal rent for the room. Although it did not require that 
§15.2. 1351 Mass. 406, 221 N.E.2d 871 (1966). 
2 G.L., c. 152, §27, reads: "If the employee is injured by reason of his serious 
and willful misconduct, he shall not receive compensation; but this provision shall 
not bar compensation to his dependents if the injury results in death." 
§15.3. 1 1967 Mass. Adv. Sh. 895, 227 N.E.2d 324. 
2
Annual Survey of Massachusetts Law, Vol. 1967 [1967], Art. 18
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/asml/vol1967/iss1/18
§15.4 WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION 257 
these resident employees perform any tasks while off duty, the em-
ployee stated that he did feel compelled to be as cooperative as pos-
sible as he was living on the premises for such a nominal rent. The 
employee was injured on his day off when he fell while walking up 
the steps to his room, conveying groceries for himself. 
The single member of the Industrial Accident Board found that the 
accident arose out of and in the course of employment. His finding 
was adopted by the Review Board and by the Superior Court, and 
was sustained by the Supreme Judicial Court. 
The fact that an employee is on the premises of his employer at 
the time he is involved in an accident does not automatically make 
injuries from such an accident compensable. There must be some 
relationship between the incident and the employment. Nevertheless, 
there is authority for the proposition that injuries on the employer's 
premises may give rise to compensation even though the injury did 
not occur during regular work hours.2 In the case at bar, the employer 
challenged the employee's claim on the grounds that there was no 
continuity of employment, as the employee had no obligation what-
soever to be on the premises at the time. 
The Court found that the employee resided on the premises, even 
without stated obligations, for the employer's benefit. The nominal 
room rent and the immediate availability of the employee to assume 
emergency responsibilities, though he was not required to do so, were 
factors sustaining this conclusion. In light of this finding, compensa-
tion was undeniably in order. The Court could further have based its 
decision on the statement in the hospital manual that employees 
were assigned to living quarters on the premises "for the convenience 
of the institution .... " 
This case should not be read as broadening the resident-employee 
compensation rule in Massachusetts. Generally, compensation is 
limited to those resident-employees who are continuously on call, and 
who are required to live on the employer's premises,s or those whose 
residence on the employer's premises is required by practical considera-
tions such as the unavailability of suitable accommodations within a 
reasonable distance from the place of employment.4 While the case at 
bar does not fall into any of these classifications, the Court has clearly 
found a definite relationship between the residence and the employ-
ment. Where the residence exists for the benefit of the employer and 
circumstances effectively require that the employee accede to perform-
ing tasks off duty, then the Court will find that a right to compensa-
tion arises. 
§15.4. Findings by the Industrial Accident Board: Jurisdiction of 
the Superior Court. In Ritchie's Case,l the findings of the Board in-
2 See Horon's Case, 346 Mass. 128, 190 N.E.2d 399 (1963); Warren's Case, 326 Mass. 
718, 97 N.E.2d 184 (1951). 
3 E.g., Doyle's Case, 256 Mass. 290, 152 N.E. 340 (1926). 
4 See Souza's Case, 316 Mass. 332, 55 N.E.2d 611 (1944). 
§15.4. l351 Mass. 495, 222 N.E.2d 687 (1966). 
3
Goldman: Chapter 15: Workmen's Compensation
Published by Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School, 1967
258 1967 ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETTS LAW §15.5 
dicated that the claimant, an 83-year-old man who was president and 
treasurer of the insured corporation, was injured when he stumbled 
while coming into his office. The stumbling occurred when he bent 
forward to pat a cat. The single member held that the injury was 
compensable. The Board reversed this decision and held that the 
injury was not a personal injury arising out of and in the course of 
employment. The Superior Court reversed the finding of the Board 
and adopted that of the single member. The Supreme Judicial Court, 
in reversing the Superior Court, held that the Superior Court had no 
power to reverse the Board and rely upon the finding of the single 
member, unless it could be shown that the Board's determination was 
either unsupported by the evidence or based upon an error of law.2 
§15.5. Proximate cause: Expert medical opinion. An injury may 
be compensable under the Workmen's Compensation Act only after 
the claimant has established a causal connection between the employ-
ment and the injury.l Advances in medical techniques have enabled 
doctors to attribute more remote illnesses to work-connected injuries. 
Thus, claims of industrial cancer and industrial heart attacks, once 
the province of speculation, are today the basis of numerous re-
coveries.2 Despite these cases, however, the burden continues to remain 
with the claimant to show a causal relationship between the work-
connected injury and the more remote illness. In Kints Case,3 the 
Supreme Judicial Court reversed the decision of the Review Board, 
which had been sustained by the Superior Court, on the grounds that 
the claimant failed to produce sufficient evidence to prove the requisite 
connection between injury and illness. 
In April 1959, the employee fell off a truck injuring his left side and 
back. The company physician strapped his back and the next day he 
returned to his job. He continued working until December 1959, but 
during this period experienced back pain. Starting in September, he 
went to several physicians, receiving a variety of treatments. None of 
them alleviated the pain. Late in December, X-rays revealed a streak-
ing on his left lung. In March 1960, the lung was removed with a 
definite diagnosis of cancer. After unsuccessful treatment, he died in 
August of the same year. "The cause of death was determined to be 
cancer which had originated in his pancreas and spread metastatically 
to other parts of his body."4 
Reversing the finding of the single member, the Board found that 
at the time of the injury the employee had cancer of the pancreas 
which had not yet metasticized, and that the fall dislodged some of 
the cancer cells which eventually spread to the rest of his body causing 
the ensuing illness and death. The Superior Court affirmed. 
2 See DiGiovanni's Case, 255 Mass. 241, 242, 151 N.E. 91, 92 (1926). 
§15.5. 1 See Dulinsky's Case, 307 Mass. 427, 429, 30 N.E.2d 215, 216 (1940). 
2 See Bonin, Comments on Recent Important Workmen's Compensation Cases, 
24 NACCA L.J. 134, 139 (1959); Page, Workmen's Compensation Law, Reviews of 
Leading Cases, 26·27 NACCA L.J. 223, 265 (1960·1961). 
31967 Mass. Adv. Sh. 789, 225 N.E.2d 900. 
4Id. at 790, 225 N.E.2d at 901. 
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The Supreme Judicial Court noted that the sole question before 
them was whether the evidence supported the finding of causal rela-
tionship. It cannot be disputed that the deterioration of health sub-
sequent to the accident and the occurrence of cancer symptoms at the 
same time were alone insufficient to establish this causal relationship. 
The claimant attempted to establish this causal relationship through 
the testimony of a specialist in internal medicine and cardiovascular 
diseases. While the doctor's opinion substantiated the claim, it was 
based exclusively upon a review of the medical records since he had 
never treated or examined the claimant. The doctor did state that the 
cancer could possibly have originated after the accident. He thought, 
however, that this was unlikely. 
The Court reversed the Review Board's grant of compensation on 
the grounds that the claimant had failed to establish the causal rela-
tionship by a preponderance of the evidence. The Court viewed the 
doctor's opinion as expressing "no more than a mathematical likeli-
hood that the employee's death was causally related to his accident."/) 
The claimant could not carry his burden to establish causation and, 
thus, had to fail. 
While the propositions of law stated by the Court are correct, it is 
submitted that their reversal of the Review Board and the Superior 
Court in this case was without their scope of review. It appears from 
the evidence that the trier of facts could have reasonably made the 
decision which was made by the Review Board. If the resolution of 
factual controversies is within the broad latitude of power given to 
the Review Board, then the reversal was not in order. Certainly there 
was sufficient evidence to sustain the finding, even if, as trier of the 
facts, the Supreme Judicial Court might have found otherwise. 
Gannon's Case6 also involved the probative value of expert medical 
testimony. In this case, the final determination of the Review Board 
in favor of the claimant was based upon the testimony of three expert 
witnesses, all of whom had examined the claimant several years sub-
sequent to his alleged injuries and had testified that the injuries 
complained of could have stemmed from the accidents as described 
by the employee. The only evidence presented by the claimant to 
prove that the compensable injuries had occurred were these reports 
made several years subsequent to the time of the original injuries. 
The employer contended that since the medical records made at the 
time of the alleged injuries contained no reference to them, there was 
not sufficient evidence of such injuries to warrant an expert opinion 
that the disabilities were causally related to the alleged injuries. 
The Court found that while the Board certainly could take into 
consideration the fact that the employee had not informed his phy-
sicians at the time of the alleged injuries, this did not give a basis to 
eliminate all expert testimony. Expert medical opinion need not 
relate only to records made at the time of the injury. The expert may 
5Id. at 792, 225 N.E.2d at 902; see Sargent v. Massachusetts Accident Co., 307 
Mass. 246, 250, 29 N.E.2d 825, 827 (1940). 
61967 Mass. Adv. Sh. 891, 227 N.E.2d 352. 
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base his conclusions "upon facts assumed in the questions put to him 
and supported either by admitted facts or by the testimony of other 
witnesses already given. . .. "7 
§15.6. Recommittal to Industrial Accident Board: Impartial phy-
sicians. Section 9 of the Workmen's Compensation Act provides for 
impartial medical examinations of claimants by Board-appointed 
physicians.! One such report in DaLomba's Case2 was stricken because 
the examining physician had been involved in more than three work-
men's compensation matters within twelve months prior to the time 
he examined the claimant.3 At the same hearing at which this report 
was stricken, another report, damaging to the employer's case, was 
admitted. Pursuant to Industrial Accident Board Rule IV-9,. the 
employer made a reasonable request for an opportunity to rebut the 
medical report. The Review Board's denial of this request was affirmed 
by the Superior Court.5 
The Supreme Judicial Court reversed the decision of the Review 
Board and held that Rule IV-9 implicitly requires that the Board "not 
deny such rebuttal if the request is received within seven days of the 
mailing of the reports."6 The Court felt that "It would be manifestly 
unfair to deprive a party, who seasonably requests it, an opportunity 
to rebut such a report."7 
§15.7. Liability in person other than insured. General Laws, 
Chapter 152, Section 15, outlines the procedures which must be fol-
lowed if an employee elects to bring an action against someone other 
than the employer. l A series of Massachusetts cases has interpreted 
7 Commonwealth v. Russ, 232 Mass. 58, 73, 122 N.E. 176, 182 (1919). 
§15.6. 1 G.L., c. 152, §9, states: "The division or any member thereof, may ap-
point a duly qualified impartial physician to examine the injured employee and 
to report." 
21967 Mass. Adv. Sh. 927, 227 N.E.2d 513. 
3 "No person shall qualify or remain qualified as an impartial physician who 
has testified in hearings under this chapter more than three times in the preceding 
twelve months, for either insurers or claimants or both unless by agreement of 
both parties. A report by a physician appointed as an impartial physician under 
this section, who at the time of his examination of the injured employee, shall have 
testified in hearings under this chapter more than three times in the preceding 
twelve months for either insurers or claimants or both, unless by agreement of 
both parties, shall be null and void and not admissable as evidence." G.L., c. 152, §9 . 
• Rule IV-9 reads: "The division or member may decline to allow rebuttal of 
reports of impartial physicians where request for such rebuttal is received later 
than seven days after mailing of such reports." 1967 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 931, 227 
N.E.2d at 517. 
5Id. at 929, 227 N.E.2d at 515. 
6Id. at 931, 227 N.E.2d at 517. 
7Id. 
§15.7. 1 "Where the injury for which compensation is payable is caused under 
circumstances creating a legal liability in some person other than the insured to 
pay damages in respect thereof, the employee may at his option proceed either at 
law against the person to recover damages or against the insurer for compensation 
under this chapter." 
6
Annual Survey of Massachusetts Law, Vol. 1967 [1967], Art. 18
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/asml/vol1967/iss1/18
§15.7 WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION 261 
this section to mean that "some person other than the insured" does 
not include a co-employee or fellow servant.2 If an employee is respon-
sible for an injury, the employer must be held responsible. Once the 
employer is so involved, then the workmen's compensation statute 
must be invoked. This was not necessarily true at common law and 
is not the rule of interpretation universally given to all such statutes, 
but there is little room for disputing the existence of this doctrine 
in Massachusetts. 
The question then becomes one of factual interpretation: whether 
the two parties involved were co-employees at the time of the accident. 
The mere fact that two parties work for the same employer does not 
necessarily make them co-employees for purposes of Section 15. In 
Comeau v. Herbert,?' the defendant had left the shop where he worked 
fifteen minutes prior to the accident and had begun driving home.· 
The defendant's car struck the plaintiff approximately twenty feet 
from where the car had been parked in an area located between two 
of the employer's mills. The record did not clearly establish that the 
injury occurred on the employer's premises. At the time of the accident, 
the plaintiff, a carpenter, was walking from one of his employer's 
shops to another. 
The Supreme Judicial Court, sustaining the plaintiff's exceptions 
to the Superior Court's entry of a verdict for the defendant after a 
jury verdict for the plaintiff, found that there was sufficient evidence 
to sustain a finding that the defendant was no longer a co-employee 
of the plaintiff at the time of the accident. Thus, the plaintiff was not 
limited in his remedies to the workmen's compensation statute. 
In DeSisto's Case,4 the Supreme Judicial Court further discussed 
the scope of Section 15. On March 20, 1961, DeSisto, an insurance 
agent, slipped and fell on ice which had accumulated on the premises 
of a policyholder. The employer filed a detailed report of the accident 
with its insurer on March 30. On April 5, an adjuster for the insurance 
carrier spoke with the claimant's attorney who advised him that the 
employee intended to proceed against the owner of the building. On 
April 25, however, the employee filed a claim for compensation. Be-
cause the employee failed to give written notice of the accident to 
the owner of the building within thirty days of the fall, as required by 
General Laws, Chapter 84, Section 21, his right of action against the 
owner was extinguished on the date of the claim for compensation. 
The insurer, in effect arguing that the payment of compensation to 
the employee was dependent upon its ability to bring a third party 
action,5 refused compensation on the grounds that the employee was 
2 Murphy v. Miettien, 317 Mass. 633, 59 N.E.2d 252 (1945); Carlson v. Dowgiele-
wicz, 304 Mass. 560, 24 N.E.2d 538 (1939); Clark v. M. W. Leahy Co., 300 Mass. 565, 
16 N.E.2d 57 (1938); Caira v. Caira, 296 Mass. 448, 6 N.E.2d 431 (1937); Dresser v. 
New Hampshire Structural Steel Co., 296 Mass. 97, 4 N.E.2d 1012 (1936); Bresnahan 
v. Barre, 286 Mass. 593, 190 N.E. 815 (1934). 
81967 Mass. Adv. Sh. 967, 227 N.E.2d 475. 
4. 351 Mass. 348, 220 N.E.2d 923 (1966). 
Ii Id. at 351, 220 N.E.2d at 925. 
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precluded from recovery because he had failed to give the notice re-
quired by statute, and, further, that he was estopped from claiming 
compensation because of the representation made to the carrier that 
he was going to proceed against the third party. 
The Supreme Judicial Court held that, while Section 15 provides 
for the employee's right of election, the election only takes place when 
the action is either brought against the third party in tort or when the 
employee reaches a settlement without bringing an action. The reason 
for this statute is to prevent the employee from obtaining double 
compensation, but it should in no way be construed to preclude him 
from enforcing his rights. The Court stated that the Workmen's 
Compensation Act's "statutory objective of protection for the employee 
takes precedence over any right of the insurer against third parties."6 
A claim of estoppel would be valid only if the employee's representa-
tion had been designed to induce a course of action on the part of 
the carrier. Here the Court found it was not. Nothing done by the 
employee precluded the carrier from protecting its rights by giving 
notice to the owner of the building. 
§15.8. Interest: Retroactive effect of statute. In Murphy'S Case,l 
the Supreme Judicial Court considered whether a 1965 amendment2 
to Section 50 of the Workmen's Compensation Act had retroactive 
effect.3 The amendment made interest on a final decree payable from 
the date of the filing of the claim, while the statute previously made 
interest payable only from the date when the board promulgated a 
decision on the claim, Murphy had filed his claim before the enact-
ment of the amendment, but the final decree awarding compensation 
was entered subsequent thereto. 
In considering the retroactive effect of the amendment, the Court 
relied on Section 2A 4 of the act which states that an amendment to 
the chapter increasing compensation is considered substantive in 
nature and applies only to injuries occurring after the effective date 
of the amendment, unless otherwise expressly provided. An amend-
ment not increasing compensation is treated as procedural or remedial 
and applies to all claims pending at the time of the enactment, regard-
less of the date of their occurrence. The Court held interest to be 
6 Id. 
§15.8. 11967 Mass. Adv. Sh. 485, 224 N.E.2d 462. 
2 Acts of 1965, c. 616. 
3 G.L., c. 152, §50, reads: "Whenever compensation is not paid within sixty days 
of notice to the insurer that compensation is claimed to be due an injured em-
ployee or his dependents, and there are one or more hearings on any question 
involving the said compensation, including appeals, and the decision is in favor of 
the employee or his dependents, interest at the rate of six per cent per annum 
from the date of the receipt of the notice of the claim by the board to the date 
of payment shall be paid by the insurer on all sums due as compensation to such 
employee or his dependents. Whenever such sums include weekly payments, interest 
shall be computed on each unpaid weekly payment." 
4 G.L., c. 152, §2A. 
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compensation within the meaning of Section 2A. Therefore, the 
amendment could not be applied retroactively. 
§15.9. Appeal of Board decision discontinuing compensation. In 
Longerato's Case,1 the employee sustained a back injury while em-
ployed by employer X. She claimed and received compensation for 
several months subsequent to the injury. After quitting her job with 
employer X, she accepted a position with employer Y. While working 
for employer Y, she sustained an injury which, she claimed, aggravated 
the pre-existing injury. The claimant then filed a claim for compen-
sation relating to this second incident. The Review Board denied 
compensation both against the insurer of employer X for further 
compensation as a result of continuing effects of the original injury 
and also against employer Y as a result of the second, aggravating 
injury. Ten months after this hearing, a second hearing was held at 
which the insurer of employer X was ordered to pay further com-
pensation for the period subsequent to the second injury. The 
insurer appealed and the Superior Court reversed the Board's deter-
mination. 
In reinstating the Board's decision, the Supreme Judicial Court 
found that the second hearing held by the Board was proper under 
Section 12 of the Workmen's Compensation Act.2 The Court further 
stated that under Section 12 there need not be a formal appeal from 
a Board order discontinuing compensation. The employee's right to 
rehearing is automatic.s The decision of the first Board was, however, 
res judicata as to employer Y. The Court's decision in Longerato 
comports with the clear language of Section 12 and it is difficult to 
conceive of the Court reaching a different result. 
§15.9. 11967 Mass. Adv. Sh. 549, 225 N.E.2d 356. 
2 G.L., c. 152, §12, reads, in pertinent part: "When in any case before the board 
it appears that compensation has been paid under an agreement of the parties or 
when in any such case there appears of record a finding that the employee is 
entitled to compensation, no subsequent finding by the board or by a member 
thereof discontinuing compensation on the ground that the employee's incapacity 
has ceased shall be considered final as a matter of fact or res judicata as a matter 
of law, and such employee or his dependents, in the event of his death, may have 
further hearings as to whether his incapacity or death is or was the result of the 
injuries for which he received compensation. 
S 1967 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 550-551, 225 N.E.2d at 358. 
9
Goldman: Chapter 15: Workmen's Compensation
Published by Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School, 1967
